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I.

INTRODUCTION

On his third tour of duty in Afghanistan, just two weeks before he was scheduled
to return home, Army Ranger Corporal Ben Kopp was mortally wounded while
fighting the Taliban.1 His heroic actions saved the lives of at least six of his fellow
Rangers.2 However, his heroism did not end there. Because he was an organ donor,
Corporal Kopp may save, improve, or prolong the lives of seventy-five more

*

J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Thank
you to everyone who aided in my research and preparation of this note, especially Professor
Browne Lewis. A special thank you to my friends and family for their support during the
writing process. Finally, a most sincere thank you to my wife, whom I love very much.
Thank you for motivating and encouraging me when I did not think I would be able to finish
this Note.
1

Hero Soldier’s Heart Keeps Giving, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://cbs5.com
/health/solider.heart.transplant.2.1121263.html.
2

Id.
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people.3 One of those fortunate people, Judy Meikle, was desperately in need of a
heart transplant.4 Now, because of Corporal Kopp’s heroism, Judy says that
everything has improved since the transplant.5 "I don't think there can be a better
tribute to Jill's [Ben’s mother] generosity and Ben's -- literally in my case -- Ben's
big brave heart, than to have his heart keep beating inside me."6 Corporal Kopp’s
mother explained, “To experience that joy along with my sorrow -- that's got to be
what a miracle feels like."7
Although many Americans are not capable of the heroism required to risk their
lives in the military, anyone can be a hero by donating his or her organs when he or
she passes away. Unfortunately, very few Americans donate their organs.8
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, only 8,019 people
who died in 2006 donated their organs.9 That represents only 0.33%, or three in
1,000, of the people who died in 2006.10 This low number has led to a current organ
waiting list of 110,127 people.11 On average, eighteen people die each day while
waiting for an organ.12 Often, after waiting on a list for an organ, people are removed
from the waiting lists because their conditions have deteriorated to the point where

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Press Release, Donate Life America, Number of Americans Willing to Donate Organs
Rises, But Still Not Keeping Pace with Need (Apr. 5, 2010), available at http://www.donate
life.net/pdfs/DLA_Survey_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf; 25 Facts About Organ Donation and
Transplantation,NATIONALKIDNEYFOUNDATION, http://www.kidney.org/news/news
room/fs_new/25factsorgdon&trans.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
9

Id.

10

Melonie Heron et. al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT 14, 18 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf.
11
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (on file
with author). This number only reflects national patient waiting lists. Id. See also Statistics,
DONATE LIFE AMERICA, http://www.donatelife.net/UnderstandingDonation/Statistics.php
[hereinafter Donate] (last visited Dec. 10, 2009) (noting that more than 100,000 individuals
currently need life-saving organ transplants).
12
DONATE, supra note 11. See also Alexander Tabarrok, Life-Saving Incentives:
Consequences, Costs and Solutions to the Organ Shortage, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY para 1
(Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/Tabarrokorgans.
html (noting that the number of individuals who die while on the waiting list is often
understated because usually it fails to include the hundreds of Americans who die after they
have become too sick to be candidates for a transplant).
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organ transplantation would not save them.13 In 2010, new entrants on the waitlist
are likely to wait ten years for that organ.14
This deficit is the result of two factors. First, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
and the National Organ Transplant Act prohibit the sale and purchase of any organ
or tissue for valuable consideration.15 Not only does this discourage donation, but it
also takes away a crucial property right from individuals, the right to exchange for
valuable consideration.16 Second, some estimate that 30% of Americans do not even
know how to become organ donors.17 These facts indicate that the current system of
voluntary, altruistic donation has failed.
Recently, Israel, another country struggling with organ deficits, decided that its
voluntary, altruistic system was not working and changed it.18 Now, the families of
the deceased organ donors are permitted to receive up to $13,400 that can be used to
memorialize the deceased.19 In doing so, Israel has become the first country in the
world to allow deceased organ donors to be rewarded.20 This plan, however, may not
go far enough towards alerting the problem of organ shortages.21
A mandated organ donation system that compensates the families of the donors is
the best way to ensure that people waiting for organs do not die needlessly, and also
ensures that individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights are not violated. Mandating
donation would guarantee the availability of organs, which could prevent hundreds
of deaths each year.
Although mandatory donation may seem like an extreme government measure,
without it, people will continue to die because of a lack of organs. Therefore, to
ensure that individuals are not unduly burdened by the taking of their organs, there
must be just compensation. For these reasons, a successful system of organ donation
needs to be both mandatory and compensatory.

13

See Tabarrok, supra note 12 para 1.

14

Robert S. Gaston et al., The Report of a National Conference on the Wait List for
Kidney Transplantation, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 775, 775 (2003), available at
http://www.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118901784/PDFSTART (report on a 2002
meeting with over 100 transplant community members that addressed individuals’ access to
kidney transplantation).
15

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 (1987) (amended 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 274e
(2010).
16
Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (stating
that a property’s value is part of the property owner’s bundle of rights).
17

DONATE, supra note 11.

18

Sally Satel, Kidney Mitzvah: Israel’s Remarkable New Steps to Solve Its Organ
Shortage, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2242791/pagenum/all/#p2. Any
comparison between the organ donation laws in Israel and the United States is outside the
scope of this note and will not be addressed.
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

See Id. The author of the article suggests that the plan would work better if the funds
could be used for anything that the families wanted. Id. This note argues that a more
effective step would be to mandate donation.
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This Note will examine the failures of uncompensated and voluntary donation
and argue that the only way to meet our country’s organ needs is to make donation
mandatory. However, because the deceased’s organs are property, the Fifth
Amendment requires any taking for public use to be compensated. Thus, the only
way to ensure that mandatory donation is constitutional is to provide compensation
to donors.
Part II of this Note examines the history of voluntary organ donation in the
United States. This history describes the evolution of organ donation laws from the
first transplant until the present day. Part II also details the consequences and
shortcomings of the current system.
Part III examines three other proposed solutions to the organ deficit. These
possible solutions include routine requests, an organ market, and presumed consent.
However, none of these solutions would increase the organ supply as effectively as a
mandatory donation system.
Part IV discusses how a mandatory donation program is the most effective way
to ensure a sufficient organ supply. Part IV also argues that once an individual dies,
the organs become the property of the deceased’s heirs. Finally, Part IV discusses
why a mandatory donation system would be unconstitutional unless donor’s families
are compensated for the taking of the deceased’s organs.
II.

HISTORY OF ORGAN DONATION IN THE UNITED STATES
22

In 1954, doctors successfully transplanted a kidney from one twin to the other
in one of the most important medical procedures in the past century.23 By 1967,
experimental heart and liver transplantation were performed successfully.24 These
medical breakthroughs required individual states to begin passing legislation in an
attempt to control the new developments.25 Finally, nationwide regulations were
deemed necessary, and in 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"), which provided for uniform regulation of anatomical gifts and defined
persons who could gift their organs.26 The goal of the UAGA was not only to

22
Organ transplantations had been performed prior to this date. The first recorded human
organ transplantation was a 1911 testis allograft, performed by surgeons in the United States.
Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY
L.J. 917, 920 (2000).
23
Susan J. Landers, Transplants: 50 Years of Saving Lives, AMEDNEWS.COM (Feb. 16,
2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/02/16/hll20216.htm.
24

Id.

25

Lloyd R. Cohen, Organ Transplant Market Would Save Lives, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29,
1996, at A19 (Californians to donate their organs through any written instrument and provided
that the heirs and executors of the decedent’s estate be obligated to abide by the bequeathal).
Id.
26

National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Prefatory Note, PENN
LAW (1987), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uaga87.pdf; UAGA § 2.
The UAGA provided that an individual of at least eighteen years of age and of sound mind
may donate his organs upon death. UAGA § 2.
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regulate, but also to encourage donation.27 In 1984, Congress passed the National
Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"), which made receiving “valuable consideration”
for an organ a federal offense, punishable by up to $50,000 and five years in
prison.28
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The 1968 UAGA allowed individuals to donate organs, eyes, and tissue as gifts
to a known donee or to any donee that might need an organ to survive.29 Though it
did not explicitly state that organs could not be given for compensation, it was
interpreted to restrict donation only to “gifts.”30 The UAGA made a variety of
advances in the law of organ donation, standardizing the process in each state and
enabled individuals to donate organs, eyes and tissue to any donee that needed an
organ to survive.31 The significant provisions expressly allow donations for medical,
research, and educational purposes;32 give priority to the wishes of the deceased;33
27
See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UAGA
Summary, ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, available at http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=67 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
NCCUSL]. “The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws . . . has
promulgated the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006) to further improve the system for
allocating organs to transplant recipients.” Id.
28
Policy Management: National Organ Transplant Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/nota.asp (last visited
Jan. 28, 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 274e. State officials were concerned that a market in human
kidneys was about to emerge. See Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, § 1, at 9. “Penalties. Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be
fined not more than $ 50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 42 U.S.C. §
274e(b).
29

NCCUSL, supra note 27.

30

Cohen, supra note 25. The chairman of the drafting committee was not clear on
whether the UAGA banned organ sales and thought that the matter should be "left to the
decency of intelligent human beings." Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of
Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 58 (1989).
31

See NCCUSL, supra note 27.

32

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (1968) (amended 1987 and 2006), available at
http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/pecorip/scccweb/etexts/deathanddying_text/uaga.htm. Section 3
provides:
The following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts
thereof for the purposes stated:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or
transplantation; or
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
or
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation; or
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and set out a prioritized list of the next of kin authorized to donate where the wishes
of the deceased are unknown.34
It was assumed no organs could be removed for transplant absent an explicit
consent to donate.35 Soon after, all fifty states had adopted some form of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act.36 Unfortunately, the 1968 UAGA did not achieve its goal of
significantly increasing donation.37 This fact, combined with the explosion of organ
transplantation that occurred beginning in the 1980’s, the recent passing of NOTA
and the fear of a market for kidneys,38 led the NCCUSL to amend the UAGA in
1987.39
The 1987 amendment addressed the changes in organ donation caused by the
increase in organ transplantation.40 Some of the changes included prohibiting the sale
of organs at death,41 reducing formalities of executing the donative document,42
prioritizing donor consent over family objection,43 and allowing medical examiners
to release any usable organ for transplantation.44 Furthermore, the 1987 UAGA
(4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
Id.
33
UAGA § 2(a) (1968) (“[a]ny individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may
give all or any part of Iris for any purposes specified in section 3, the gift to take effect upon
death.”). The following subsection, however, only allows the next of kin to authorize a
donation “in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent.” Id. § 2(b).
34

Id. § 2(b). Section 2 provides:
Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated . . . may give all or any part
of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in section 3.
(1) The spouse,
(2) An adult son or daughter,
(3) Either parent,
(4) An adult brother or sister,
(5) The guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
(6) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.

35

Id.

36

Hansmann, supra note 30, at 58.

37

Id. at 9.

38

Sullivan, supra note 28.

39

NCCUSL, supra note 27. “In the late 1970s, the invention of cyclosporin, an
immunosuppressive drug, revolutionized organ transplantation, advancing it from an
experimental operation to a legitimate mode of treatment.” Siegel, supra note 22, at 920-21.
40

Siegel, supra note 22, at 933

41

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 10.

42

Id. § 2.

43

Id. § 2(h).

44

Id. § 4.
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reinforced a trend in presumed consent statutes when it recommended presumed
consent for the donation of any organ or tissue from cadavers under the custody of
coroners or medical examiners.45 Unlike the original act, which was swiftly adopted
by all states, the amendment faced stiff resistance.46 Eventually, twenty six-states
adopted the 1987 revisions.47 This resulted in non-uniformity of state laws, which
was only increased by subsequent changes by individual states.48
More recently, the NCCUSL decided to make amendments in order to resolve
any inconsistencies and hopefully encourage more organ donation.49 One of the
revisions was the elimination of presumed consent.50 The NCCUSL made clear that
“[o]rgan donation is a purely voluntary decision that must be clearly conveyed
before an individual’s organs are available for transplant.”51 As of November 1,
2009, the 2006 UAGA has been enacted in thirty-six states and the District of
Columbia, and has been introduced as currently pending bills in three other states.52
Although more states have adopted the 2006 amendments, its goal of increasing
organ donation has not been met.53
The UAGA has also been used by plaintiffs to argue that a personal property
right exists “in the body organs of a decedent . . . giving relatives the right to consent
to organ donation.”54 Although the “right to consent to organ donation” is not

45

Id. States were much more inclined to use presumed consent in relation to corneal or
eye tissue. Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Legislative Consent Law?, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 257, 266 (2002).
46

Ann McIntosh, Regulating the “Gift of Life” — The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 176 (1990). The debate focused on the authorization provisions and
the routine inquiry requirement. The prohibition on organ sale was also criticized. Id.
47

NCCUSL, supra note 27.

48

Id.

49

Id. “The 2006 Act further simplifies the document of gift and accommodates the forms
commonly found on the backs of driver’s licenses in the United States. It also strengthens the
power of an individual not to donate his or her parts by permitting the individual to sign a
refusal that also bars others from making a gift of the individual’s parts after the individual’s
death.” Id.
50

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006) § 8.

51

NCCUSL, supra note 27.

52

NCCUSL, Enactment Status Map, http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.
aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=72 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
53

Press Release, Donate Life America, Number of Americans Willing to Donate Organs
Rises, But Still Not keeping Pace with need (Apr. 5 2010), available at,
http://www.donatelife. net/pdfs/DLA_Survey_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf. Deceased donors
have decreased each year after 2006. In 2007, 8,085 deceased people donated. Milton R.
Benjamin, The Miracle of Transplantation, VERO BEACHSIDE, Oct. 15, 2009). By 2008, the
number dropped to 7,990. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, At-a-Glance
(Mar. 18, 2010) http://optn. transplant.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_
259.pdf.
54

Kathryn E. Peterson, Note, My Father's Eyes and My Mother's Heart: The Due Process
Rights of the Next of Kin in Organ Donation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 169, 188 (2005).
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“synonymous with a personal property right,” it does open the door to the assertion.55
Furthermore, the UAGA allows a decedent to direct donation of a body part or organ
to a specific named individual.56 This gives added weight to the claim that the heirs
inherit a personal property right in the organs of the deceased.57
B. The National Organ Transplantation Act
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act amid fears of a
commercial market in kidneys.58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate
the shortage of transplantable organs.59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant
legislation for several reasons. First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market
by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce.60 Lawmakers were
worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs.61
Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ
Transplantation (“Task Force”), which was charged with “conduct[ing]
comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social
issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation.”62 The Task
Force recommended that hospitals “adopt routine inquiry/required request policies
and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing
next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation.”63 Congress adopted the
55

Id.

56

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006) § 11(a)(2).

57

See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 54.

58

See Cohen, supra note 25; see also S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3974, 3976-77.
59

H.R. REP. NO. 98-769 (2d Sess. 1984); S. REP. NO. 98-382 (1984).

60

See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (a) (1984). This section provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Id. § 274e(a). Congress has the power to legislate on organ transplantation through the
commerce clause. Since the Supreme Court has held that activity is commerce if it has a
“substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce or if the “cumulative effect” of one act
could have an effect on such commerce, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), organ
transplantation would probably be considered in interstate commerce Susan H. Denise,
Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1985). Regardless,
whether or not organ transplantation can be regulated under the commerce clause is beyond
the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
61

John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program: When Push Comes
to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197, 208-09 (1994).
62
63

Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339.

Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems, 70
U. Col. L. Rev. 1019, 1029 (1999), citing Task Force on Organ Transplantation, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Serv., Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations 3 (1986).
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recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare
funding if they fail to establish “written protocols for the identification of potential
organ donors.”64
NOTA also established the system of organ procurement and distribution that
currently operates in the United States. NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services to provide for the establishment and
operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (“OPTN”), which
oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country.65 Some of
the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need
organs;66 maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with
available organs;67 establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system;68
working actively on ways to “increase the supply of organs;”69 and coordinating for
the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations (“OPOs”) to
transplant centers.70
NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs.71
The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all
donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the
64

42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A) (1994). The statute provides that these protocols should:
(i) assure that families of potential organ donors are made aware of the
option of organ or tissue donation and their option to decline,
(ii) encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances,
views, and beliefs of such families, and
(iii) require that such hospital's designated organ procurement agency... is
notified of potential organ donors.

§ 1320b-8(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Although the provision gives the federal government substantial
power to control hospitals and increase the number of harvested cadaver organs, the system is
not closely monitored and has not lived up to its potential to increase the organ supply. See
Lisa E. Douglass, Organ Donation, Procurement and Transplantation: The Process, the
Problems, the Law, 65 UMKC L. REV. 201, 211 (1996).
65

Gail L. Daubert, Politics, Policies and Problems with Organ Transplantation:
Government Regulations Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADM. L R. 459 (1998).
“The U.S. Congress established the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)
when it enacted the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984. The Act called for a
unified transplant network to be operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal
contract.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 11.
66

42 U.SC. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i).

67

42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(ii). The OPTN maintains a nationwide system through the
use of computers to match individuals with the organs they need. Id.
68
42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (laying out the general functions that the OPTN partakes in to
procure organs). This section establishes some methods to allocate organs to people on the
waiting list, including the requirement that the OPTN "maintain a twenty-four-hour telephone
service to facilitate matching organs with individuals included in the list." § 274(b)(C).
69

42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(K).

70

42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(G).

71

42 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2006).
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transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN,
and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs.72
The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the
current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region.73 In
2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ.74 This figure
demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day
while waiting for an organ.
Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”), an existing
central registry of potential kidney recipients, to administer the OPTN.75 The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) contracted with UNOS in 1986
and has renewed the contract four times.76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called
the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation
are a public trust."77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation;
developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically
feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of
the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients,
families and health care providers."78 The three main performance goals of the Final
Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant
centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same
time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by
medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to
those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical
judgment," without regard to their geographic location.79 Though these goals appear
noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue – a lack
of transplantable organs.
C. Consequences of the Acts
Although the 1968, 1987, and 2006 UAGAs, NOTA, and America's current
altruistic system of organ procurement were designed to increase the supply of
transplantable organs, none have cured America's organ shortage.80 This shortage has
72

42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3).

73

Sheryl G. Stolberg, Fight over Organs Shifts to States from Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/11/us/fight-over-organs-shifts-to-states-fromwashington.html.
74

Health Resources and Services Administration, 2007 OPTN/SRTR Ann. Rep., tbl.1.3,
available at http:/optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/annualReport.asp.
75

Daubert, supra note 65.

76

UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, Newsroom: UNOS Again Receives Federal
Contract for Transplant Allocation Network, (Sept. 28. 2000), www.unos.org (search “UNOS
again Receives Federal Contract”; then follow “Newsroom September 28, 2000” hyperlink.)
77

Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,298 (Apr. 2,
1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).
78

Id. at 16,296.

79

Id.

80

DONATE, supra note 11.
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unfortunately led to a global black market in organ sales and transplant tourism. 81
These adverse outcomes demonstrate the failure of the current organ donation
system.
1.

Organ Shortage

The disparity between people in need of organs and the number of organs
actually donated has been well documented.82 Disturbingly, over 100,000 people are
on waiting lists for organs.83 Of those, around 82,000 are waiting for a kidney.84 The
size of the waiting list is only an approximate measure of the shortage because it
fails to account for the deaths of patients on the lists.85 It also does not account for
patients who are turned down for listing due to age, blood type, or illness.86 The lack
of supply of organs is also evidenced by the median waiting period a person must
wait on the waiting list before the transplantation procedure occurs. According to
the latest information available, in 2006, the median waiting period for a liver was
306 days, and in 2003, the median waiting period for a kidney was a staggering
1,152 days.87 As organ transplant waiting lists grow longer, the death rates for
individuals waiting for an available organ increase.88
Although over two million people die each year in the United States,89 most of
their cadaveric organs are not suitable for transplant. This is because almost all
suitable organs come from brain-dead patients whose breathing and cardiac activity

81
Robyn S. Shapiro, Legal Issues in Payment of Living Donors for Solid Organs, HUM.
RIGHTS MAG., Spring 2003, at 19; Joanna Geary, Illegal Live Organ Surgery Reopens Donor
Debate, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 24, 2003, at 2; Vidya Ram, International Traffic in Human
Organs, 19 FRONTLINE, Issue 7, Mar. 30 - Apr. 12, 2002, at 61, available at
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1907/19070730.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
82

See DONATE, supra note 11; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra
note 8; Daubert, supra note 65. See also, Liliana M. Kalogjera, New Means of Increasing the
Transplant Organ Supply: Ethical and Legal Issues, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 19 (2007). “The organ
shortage continues to grow despite multifaceted efforts to increase the transplant organ
supply." Id. at 20.
83

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 8.

84

Id.

85

See David L. Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL'Y 567, 567-81 (2002). See also, Tabarrok, supra note 7.
86

Id.

87

Health Resources and Services Administration, supra note 74 at tbl.1.5.

88

Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of 1999: Hearing on
H.R. 2418 Before the H. Comm. on Commerce and the Subcomm. on Health and Environment,
105th Cong. (1999) (statement of William F. Raub, Deputy Assistant for Science Policy, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services). In 1998, more than 4,000 potential donor
recipients died waiting for an organ transplant. Id. "As these [waiting] lists grow, many more
will die as the system continues to strain under the demand for organs." Id.
89
Heron et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2006, 56 NVSR Number 16, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/PRESSROOM/08newsreleases/mortality2006.htm (last visited Dec.
10, 2009).
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have been artificially maintained.90 For this reason, normally organs can only be
collected from individuals who died in hospitals. In any given year, about half of
those who die in the United States die in hospitals.91 Furthermore, organ donors who
meet the criteria for donation after brain death are usually 59 years of age or
younger.92 These factors also contribute to the lack of organs. However, studies
have indicated that the number of potential cadaveric organs would meet or exceed
the demand.93
A 1999 study showed that 81% of Americans support organ donation.94
Unfortunately, nowhere near that percentage of people agree to donate their organs.95
This deficiency adds approximately 48,000 people to the organ waiting list each
year.96 However, in the past three years, less than 15,000 people donated organs.97
Without an increase in the supply of organs, the waiting list will continue to grow,
leading to more deaths and providing more clients for the black market.
2.

Black Market

Throughout history, whenever laws were designed to regulate or eliminate
certain exchanges, an underground market would appear.98 For example, when the
Eighteenth Amendment was ratified,99 an immediate black market sprung up and led
90

Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667 (2003).
91

Bart, Macon, Whittier, Baldwin & Blount, Cadaveric Kidneys For Transplantation: A
Paradox of Shortage in the Face of Plenty, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 379-81 (1982) (indicating
that 60% of people who die in the United States die in hospitals).
92

Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation after Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 209,
213 (2007).
93

McIntosh, supra note 46, at 185.

94

PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Organ Donor Topline,
http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=298 (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). In the
same survey 42% of respondents reported that they signed a donor card. Id.
95

See DONATE, supra note11. Only 30% of people even know the steps to be taken in
order to donate. Id.
96

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 8.

97

Id.

98

HANS F. SENNHOLZ, THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 3-4 (1984), available at
http://www.hacer.org/pdf/Sennholz01.pdf.
“The underground economy must be
distinguished clearly and unmistakably from the criminal activities of the underworld . . . Both
groups are knowingly violating laws and regulations and defying political authority. But they
differ radically in the role they play in society. The underworld comprises criminals who are
committing acts of bribery, fraud, and racketeering, and willfully inflicting wrongs on society.
The underground economy involves otherwise law-abiding citizens who are seeking refuge
from the wrongs inflicted on them by government.” Id. For the purposes of this note, the
phrases black market and underground market will both refer to the underground organ
market.
99
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933). In response to the needs of the
First World War, the United States Congress prohibited the sale, manufacture and importation
of all intoxicating liquors. See Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace:
The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment, and State Regulation of
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to an increase in organized crime.100 As the organ donor waiting list grows longer,
more people will begin turning to the black market in a last ditch effort to save their
lives.101 Around 300 Americans travel abroad each year in an attempt to purchase
organs that will save their lives.102 Though organ sales are illegal in most
countries,103 individuals facing death have found creative ways to purchase organs in
several countries.104 Transplant tourism is a very structured and lucrative business.
Often, companies offer packages including airfare, accommodations, and medical
care, as well as the organ.105 This development is hardly surprising given the dire
situations of both the persons needing an organ and the donors.106 Unfortunately, the
brokers prey on this desperation. Kidney donors in India earn between $1,250 and
Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 302-03 (2002). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt initiated the repeal of this law as part of his New Deal Program. The Eighteenth
Amendment was effectively repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment. Id. at 303. See also
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
100
Igor V. Dubinsky, Comment, How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in
Transforming Criminal Organizations Into Legitimate Entities By Making Rehabilitation an
Economic Necessity, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 379, at 410 (2007). “With the advent of this
tremendous new black market, legal distilleries and businessmen were rapidly substituted by
organizations skilled in secrecy and bribery.” Id.
101

See Organs for Sale: China's Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners'
Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Oper. and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on
Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 24, 28 (2001) (testimony of Professor Nancy Scheper-Hughes)
(testifying that “the traffic in human organs, tissues, and body parts” is extensive, occurring in
China, India, Brazil, and other countries).
102

See Eamonn O'Neill, The Cost of Living, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar. 10, 2001, at 14,

103

J. Andrew Hughes, You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement
Policy in Light of Foreign Models, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 362 (2009).
104

See Marina Jimenez, Europe's Poorest Sell Their Kidneys, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 29,
2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 17680080. These countries include Israel, India, South
Africa, Turkey, China, Russia, Iraq, Argentina, and Brazil. Id.
105

Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture
Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 Bulletin of the World Health Organization
901 (December 2007), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06039370/en/. These packages are referred to as medical tourism. A cursory Google search
yields many results. One site seems to offer kidney transplants for $19,750 in India but claims
individuals must have a donor. http://www.allmedicaltourism.com/usa/surgery/kidneytransplant/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). Another site makes no mention of a donor or price.
http://www.indiamedicaltourism.net/medical_tourism_india_medical_packages/dialysis
_kidney_transplant.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
106

Kathleen Maclay, UC Berkeley Anthropology Professor Working on Organs
Trafficking, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS (April 30, 2004, 8:34 PM),
http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/ 2004/04/30_organs.shtml. “Transplant tourism
involving trafficked living organ donors is increasingly common in a world where, she says,
cadaver organs are scarce, while desperately poor people are plentiful and “available.”
Transplant patients can now buy a “fresh” kidney from a stranger if they have enough cash,
health insurance and the right connections with organs brokers. They also have to be willing
to break the laws against buying and selling human body parts and be willing to travel to
distant lands.” Id.

336

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 24:323

$2,500, while the donees typically pay around $25,000, leaving the difference to the
unscrupulous brokers and doctors.107
Participation in underground markets is incredibly risky.
Underground
transactions often consist of inadequate information, a lack of remedies when
disagreements arise or fraud occurs, and, in organ transactions, desperate donors and
donees dealing with greedy brokers.108 The donors are often left in an even worse
financial state after they donate because of medical bills and the inability to continue
working.109 Comparing the countries of the donees to the countries of the donors
further illustrates the gap between the haves and have-nots. The countries receiving
the most organs are several of the world’s most wealthy nations, including the
United States, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Australia.110 On the other end
of the spectrum, Pakistan, India, China, the Philippines, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Iraq,
Turkey, and the Republic of Moldova comprise the nations whose citizens donate the
most organs.111 In India alone, over 2,000 citizens “donated” a kidney.112 It is also
not surprising that Pakistan is on the list because they have no law against the sale of
organs.113
Even more shocking, human rights violations are rampant. Reports have
emerged from Thailand about patients at hospitals whose organs were harvested
before they were dead.114 In both Argentina and South Africa, there have been claims
that homeless people were killed to harvest their organs.115 In China, prisoners with
the correct blood type were selected for execution so that their organs could be
harvested.116
Black market activity occurs in the United States as well. Several United States
107

Anuj Chopra, Organ-Transplant Black Market Thrives in India, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9,
2008, at A7 available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/02/09/MN23UPQ0K.DTL.
108

MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 170
(2006). See generally GARY W. BRUNETTE, CDC HEALTH INFORMATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRAVEL 2010 183 (Sue Hodgson et al. eds., 2010) available at
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/yellowBookCh2-HealthCareAbroad.aspx.
109

See Nullis-Kapp, Organ Trafficking and Transplantation Pose New Challenges, 82
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.715 (2004), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/
82/9/infocus.pdf. See also Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of
Selling a Kidney in India, 288 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 1589-91 (2002).
110

Shimazono, supra note 105.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Hughes, supra note 103.

114

Erica Teagarden, Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws, 30 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 85, 689 (2005).
115
116

O’Neill, supra note 102.

U.S./China Relations and Human Rights: Is Constructive Engagement Working?
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the H. of Rep. Comm.
on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. 14 (1997) (statement of Harry Wu, Exec. Dir., The Laogai
Research Foundation).
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hospitals have a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy when it comes to organ donation, and
organ brokers know which hospitals to use. 117 Foreign and domestic patients arrive
with the paid donors and pretend to be related to avoid detection.118 Recently, dozens
of Moldavians were suspected of entering the country to sell their organs in this
manner.119 Without a change, neither the black market nor the massive organ
shortages will be eliminated.
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The United States system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase
organ supplies and has contributed to the burgeoning black market organ trade.120
Proposals to increase organ donation include organ markets,121 routine request,122
presumed consent123 and organ drafts.124 There have been many proposed reforms,
but this Note argues that the best way to ensure adequate organ supply is a
compensated, but mandatory, organ draft.125
A. Organ Market
In a traditional organ market system, organs are commodities that should be
bought and sold in a free market system with minimal regulation.126 The regulations
should be limited to ensuring that individuals are properly matched, determining
who can enter the market, and assuring that neither party is taking advantage of the
other unconscionably.127 It is contended that the benefits of such a system include an
immediate response to the shortage of organs, a decrease in cost associated with

117
Your Money or Your Life: The Kidney Trade, CBSNEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2002/02/11/48hours/main328962.shtml (last visited July 31, 2002, 9:15 PM)
(citing to Dr. Michael Friedlander).
118

Id.

119

Jimenez, supra note 104.

120

See supra Parts II.C.1-2.

121

See Hughes, supra note 103 (arguing that states should experiment with regulated open
markets for cadaveric organs).
122
Marlene R. Matten et al., Nurses' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs Regarding Organ
and Tissue Donation and Transplantation, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 155, 157 (1991) (arguing
for routine request).
123

See Jesse Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811,
837 (1970) (concluding that the organ supply would increase significantly if usable organs
were routinely removed from cadavers except where the potential donor or her family had
registered an objection to removal).
124
See Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model
Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 695 (1988) (advocating an organ draft, without
compensation, for transplantable cadaveric organs).
125

There would still be a limited exception for religious reasons. See infra Part III.D.1.

126

Christopher J. Ryan, The Anatomical Wealth of Nations: A Free Market Approach to
Organ Procurement, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 427, 437 (2009).
127

Id. at 436.
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maintaining people who would no longer be sick after transplantation, and an
incentive to encourage people to donate.128
A futures market in organs is a more radical financial incentive some have
proposed, claiming it would increase the organ supply.129 The hope is that in addition
to increasing organ supply, a futures market would discourage the economic
exploitation of the poor that most likely would occur in an open organ market.130 In
the most basic version of a futures market, as proposed by scholars Lloyd Cohen and
Gregory Crespi, individuals could sell the right to harvest their organs upon death as
a futures contract.131 In return, if one’s organs were subsequently taken, a beneficiary
designated by the donor at the time he executed the contract would receive the
contractual payment.132 The thought is that poor organ sellers would not be exploited
because living donor transactions would still be prohibited, their consent would not
be motivated by economics, and they would not risk their health by entering such
contracts.133 Equal access to the organ supply for poor organ recipients might be
maintained by using the futures market as a supply mechanism but not as an
allocation mechanism.134 The system, if it works as intended, could provide that
potential recipients would not be responsible for making the payments.135 However,
this system still fails to address the issue that the poor may still be coerced into
donating with the knowledge that their families will be better off after they die.
The problems associated with an organ market far outweigh any potential
benefits. First, Americans have demonstrated a moral aversion to a market in human
organs.136 One reason for this feeling is the fear that the poor would be coerced into
donating their organs in an attempt to escape poverty.137 This fear is based on the

128

Id. at 438-42.

129

Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 108 (2004).
130

Id. at 108. The recent film Repo Men, depicts a dystopic future where organs are
regulated by a free market system. REPO MEN (Universal Pictures 2010). In the film, organs
are so expensive that people who need them are forced to buy them with credit. Id. When
they are unable to make payments, the repo men come and “repossess” the organs. Id.
131

See Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1994); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing
the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
1 (1989).
132

Cohen, supra note 131, at 2. The futures market could be designed to apply only to
specific organs, or to be valid for only a short duration, allowing the seller to revisit his
decision periodically; see Hansmann, supra note 28, at 62.
133

Cohen, supra note 131, at 2.

134

Calandrillo, supra note 129, at 108.

135

Cohen, supra note 131, at 30.

136

See Christian Williams, Combating the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and
Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
315, 316 (1994).
137

Id. at 343.
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realities of the black market.138 In countries where organ sales are legal, the poor
have been exploited.139 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the
commercialization of organs would satisfy the demand.140 This commercialization
would result in outrageous prices for organs and effectively deny organs to the
poor.141 Finally, the ruling in Moore v. Regents of the University of California would
seem to prohibit the sale of any organs or tissue of a living person.142 Since this
ruling relied on the UAGA, all states would attempt to apply this ruling uniformly.
Therefore, a free market in organs would not yield the needed organs, but would
cause organ allocation to be based on wealth and would be contrary to precedent.
B. Routine Request
Proponents of the routine request system, also called mandated choice, argue that
if people were forced to choose whether or not to donate, more people would.143 The
mandated choice system would require a citizen's organ donation preference to be
recorded at a certain point during his or her life, for example, when a citizen “file[s]
a tax return or obtain[s] or renews a driver's license.”144 This system is used today in
most places.145 Furthermore, if the number of times people were asked was
increased, it may be financially and logistically prohibitive to maintain a system that
records each citizen's organ donation preference.146 Currently, forty-six states require
individuals to opt in or opt out when obtaining driver’s licenses, and many hospitals
ask for donations on intake forms.147
The 1987 revision to the UAGA called for health care professionals to ask
families of deceased individuals to consent to organ donation if their loved one had

138

See supra Part II.C.2.

139

Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic of Human Organs, 41 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 191, 193-94 (2000).
140

Hearts, lungs, and whole livers cannot be donated inter vivos. This would require a
speculative futures market with low value and unlikely returns or sales by surviving heirs.
Also, it is not safe to assume that those heirs would be willing to sell their recently passed
relatives organs. Even more critically, it is extremely unlikely that as many people would
donate their organs for valuable consideration as would be conscripted through the proposal in
this note.
141

See Goyal et al, supra note 109, at 1589 (96% of organ sales were to escape poverty),
see generally, Scheper-Hughes, supra note 139.
142

See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

143

See Dukeminier, supra note 123.

144

Denise Spellman, Encouragement Is Not Enough: The Benefits of Instituting a
Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353, 371 (2006).
145
DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM, 48-49 (Marvin H. Kosters, 2002).
146

Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the Ethical
Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 183 (1997).
147

Kasermsn & Barnett, supra note 145, at 54.
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not already signed an organ donor card.148 There is still debate, however, over who
should ask for such consent (i.e., doctor, nurse, hospital staff, or OPO
representative), and whether or not it would work in practice. Unfortunately, results
of required request policies have not been successful.149
There have been several attempts to explain why this occurs. One commentator
has suggested that this outcome is a result of psychological factors.150 He suggests
that individuals may have negative feelings towards organ procurement because of
its relationship with death and that these feelings impact the legal systems designed
to encourage donation.151 Emotional issues involved may deter the decedent's family
from agreeing to donation, as well as prevent health care professionals from feeling
comfortable enough to sensitively request donation from the family.152 Therefore, he
proposes that the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological
issues involved in procurement rather than adopting more restrictive legal regimes,
like presumed consent.153 This solution could be accomplished by educating health
providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that
allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving,154 These
measures alone, he argues, would significantly increase the number of organ donors.
Thus, legally mandating that health care providers ask for organs is not likely to
have a dramatic impact if done alone. Required request statutes need to be
accompanied by training, education, and public awareness campaigns if they are to
have the impact on organ procurement rates that was initially anticipated. They may
play an important role in demonstrating that this issue is important and needs to be
addressed. However, because most states already employ routine request, and organ
donation numbers are still woefully low, routine request is not an adequate solution.
C. Presumed Consent
Commentators who argue for a presumed consent system believe that the true
reason people do not donate is because it requires an affirmative action to donate.155
These commentators claim either that people do not want to confront their own
mortality, or that people are just too unmotivated even to check a box when
148
Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3 (1987). All hospitals are required by law to have a
“Required Referral” system in place. Under it, the hospital must notify the local Organ
Procurement Organization (OPO) of all patient deaths. If the OPO determines that organ
and/or tissue donation is appropriate in a particular case, they will have a representative
contact the deceased patient's family to offer them the option of donating their loved one's
organs and tissues.
149
Orly Hazony, Increasing the Supply of Cadaver Organs for Transplantation:
Recognizing that the Real Problem is Psychological Not Legal, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 219, 231
(1993).
150

Id. at 220

151

Id. at 236

152

Id.

153

Id. at 256-57.

154

Id. at 257.

155

Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation As National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ
Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1593, 1598 (1993)
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renewing their driver’s license.156 Under presumed consent, instead of having an
option to opt in, individuals must actively opt out. Many countries employ this
system with some success.157 Unfortunately, this system is partially in effect in the
United States with regard to corneas after the 1987 UAGA, and the significance of
any increase in donation or transplants is arguable.158 Even Austria, where the
strictest form of presumed consent is applied, suffers from a shortage of
transplantable organs.159 Furthermore, if people are just too unmotivated to opt out,
presumed consent is merely a disguised form of conscription without the benefit of
society understanding the important message that the living come before the dead.160
If it is true that presumed consent is a disguised form of conscription, it could be
argued that it violates the Fifth Amendment.161 For these reasons, outright
conscription would be more straightforward and would allow compensation for
donation.
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Organ Conscription

In order to discuss the benefits of and problems with organ conscription, it is
necessary to elaborate on how it would operate. Organ conscription would require
that every person, outside of exempted persons,162 who dies under the circumstances
enabling organ transplantation, must automatically donate their organs. In
consideration, each person’s heirs would be compensated for any organs transplanted
at the value determined to be just compensation.163 The current regional and national
organizations, including OPTN and UNOS, who match donors would continue to
operate as they do now. Furthermore, the implementation would need to be done at
the state level. It could be accomplished through an amendment to the UAGA,
which would then need to be adopted by the states. In addition, each state would
156

See id. at 1597.

157

Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming Public
Support for Organ Donation v. Under-Supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ Procurement
Study, 21 J. CORP. L. 767, 778 (1996). See also, Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To
Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. &
MED. 213, 225 (2001) (describing presumed consent laws in France, Belgium, and Austria);
Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, Note, The United States System of Organ
Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: “And the Winner
Is ...,” 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 21, 24 (1995) (citing similar presumed consent models in Chile,
Argentina, and Brazil).
158

Goodwin, supra note 108, at 121-123

159

Harris & Alcorn, supra note 157, at 225.

160

Silver, supra note 124, at 706.

161

See infra part IV.B.1.

162

All mentally competent individuals over the age of 18, who do not get a religious
exemption would have their organs conscripted upon death if they could be transplanted.
Reasons they could not be transplanted include the manner of death, place of death and organ
integrity/health.
163

See infra part IV.B.1.b.
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need to create a board to determine whether people wishing to be excluded met the
qualifications for exemption. The governor should appoint these state boards every
four years, and they should represent a diverse mixture of religious and community
leaders.
The primary reason for, and benefit of, conscripting organs is the immediate
impact upon organ shortages. No one would deny that conscription is the quickest
way to obtain the organs needed because, through organ conscription, almost all
usable organs would be harvested. If two million people die each year, and sixty
percent of those people die in circumstances suitable for organ transplantation, organ
demand would slow to a trickle in this country.164 Moreover, at least one court has
noted that removing organs is good public policy and a legitimate state interest.165
Yet, conscripting organs does present several important issues.
B.
1.

Concerns
The Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment forbids the government from taking private property for a
public use without just compensation.166 When analyzing whether a taking has
occurred, the courts must determine whether a government action could be properly
characterized as regulatory or a permanent physical invasion.167 If it is a regulation
that denies all economically beneficial use, it is a taking.168 If not, courts use a casespecific, multifactor-balancing test that considers the government's interest, the
scope of the restriction, and the diminution in the value of the property.169 However,
if there has been a physical appropriation, it is a taking, regardless of any public
purpose.170 This “per se” rule clearly applies to organ conscription.171 The Supreme
164
Even with a conservative estimate of ten percent of those who die being suitable donors,
over 200,000 organs would be available. Just over 105,000 people are currently on waiting
lists. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 11.
165
State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1193-94 (Fla. 1986) (holding state interest in providing
sight to the blind was so great that removal without notifying next of kin was acceptable).
Certainly the state interest in providing life-saving livers, kidneys and hearts is even more
compelling.
166
U.S. CONST. amend. V. “ . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Id.
167

See G. STONE, L SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1580
(LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, 1991). It is difficult to distinguish a regulation from a taking.
“Almost all government action . . . diminishes the value of some people's property and
increases the value of the property of other people.” Id.
168
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). “[R]egulatory
action is compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint . . . [where] regulation denies all beneficial or productive use of the
land.” Id at 1015.
169
170

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982).
“Permanent physical occupation” (even a minor one) “is a taking without regard to the public
interests that [the government action] may serve.” Id.
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Court has adopted the “per se” rule because the invasion would destroy the
individual’s bundle of property rights.172 When a doctor removes an organ from a
deceased person and plans to transplant it into someone else, there has most certainly
been a physical invasion. Thus, if the government wanted to conscript organs, it
would need to pay just compensation and show that it satisfies a public purpose.
Even if the government pays just compensation for the organ conscription, it
must still satisfy the Fifth Amendment requirement of public use. The Supreme
Court has held that “one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid.”173 There is a persuasive argument that organ conscription is a
public purpose. Thousands of people are in desperate need of organs, and the state
has a compelling interest in improving the public health. Furthermore, public
purpose has been interpreted so broadly that almost anything is a public purpose.174
Seemingly, as long as the legislature says that it is a public purpose, the courts will
show almost complete deference to its determination.175 The questions become
whether organs are property, and what compensation is just.
a.

The Deceased’s Organs Are Property

“In its precise legal sense, property is nothing more than a collection of rights.”176
Thus, property is often described as a bundle of rights or interests that a person has
in an object, including the right to use, possess, exclude, and dispose.177 The more
rights and characteristics an item has in its bundle, the more likely it is to be
considered property.178 An item with only one or two of the characteristic rights in
171
However, the government may attempt to assert a variety of traditional Takings Clause
defenses to avoid liability for the removal of organs. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (where regulation results in a reciprocity of advantage, no taking has
occurred); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (nuisance prevention is within
the purview of state police power and not a taking). The defense to takings as merely
nuisance abatement seems inapplicable because it is difficult to characterize maintaining the
integrity of a corpse as a nuisance. One could argue that there is a reciprocity of advantage
based on the fact that the mandatory taking of organs makes it more likely that a relative
would receive an organ if they needed it. However, reciprocity of advantage should benefit
the individual who is the subject of the taking ad any benefit to friends and family seems too
remote.
172
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. Where permanent physical occupation is present, “the
government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.” Id. at 435.
173

Hawaii House Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). “Public use” is broadly interpreted; as the
Court states in Midkiff, it will defer to the legislatures determination “until it is shown to
involve an impossibility.” Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
174

Id.

175

Id.

176

63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1997).

177

See id. This list of property rights is neither exhaustive nor conclusive. See generally id.

178

See Peterson, supra note 54, at 181-82 (citing First Victoria Nat’l Bank v. United States,
620 F.2d 1096, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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the bundle may still be considered property.179 It is important to determine whether
something is property because someone must be named the owner, and that person
“gets the relevant bundle of rights protected by law.”180 Furthermore, “[p]roperty
rights both create and protect the reasonable expectations of an individual in his or
her dealings with others in society. Through consistent application, property rights
provide predictable results in given situations.”181
The problem with defining the organs of the deceased as property is that the
inevitable question of who can claim ownership of the organs arises.182 The
traditional view that the corpse was not property emerged largely because there was
no financial value in corpses.183 Inevitably, disputes arose over proper burial, organ
donation, and other familial squabbling.184 These disputes often cast the dead body as
a thing, a sign suggesting that the decedent's immediate family or spouse should hold
the right to possess, dispose of, or transfer the corpse in whole or in part.185 The law
fails to provide reasonable expectations or predictability with regard to human
bodies and their disposition because it lacks a precise definition of the rights
surrounding the dead bodies.186
Originally, the common law did not recognize the corpse as property.187
Ecclesiastical courts in England had province over bodily remains, while the legal
courts' jurisdictional power was limited to matters surrounding the burial site, grave
179
See First Victoria, 620 F.2d at 1104. “‘Property’ evolves over time. It can be described
as the bundle of rights attached to things conferred by law or custom, or as everything of value
which a person owns that is or may be the subject of sale or exchange. Both of these
definitions contemplate the possibility that law or custom may create property rights where
none were earlier thought to exist.” Id. at 1103 (internal citations omitted).
180

See Prue Vines, The Sacred and the Profane: The Role of Property Concepts in
Disputes About Post-mortem Examination, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 235, 246 (2007).
181
Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 227 (1986).
182

See Vines, supra note 180, at 237.

183

See Vines, supra note 180, at 236-37.

184
See Spanich v. Reichelderfer, 628 N.E.2d 102, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (dispute
between a decedent’s husband and her relatives over “unearthing and removing the
[decedent’s] remains”); see Brownlee v. Pratt, 68 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946)
(daughter protested the action of her step-mother placing the step-mother’s second’s
husband’s remains in the same burial vault as the daughter’s mother and father); see Herold v.
Herold, 1905 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 127, 1 (C.P. 1905) (dispute over custody of decedent’s body
between a widow and father of the deceased).
185

See, e.g., Spanich, 628 N.E.2d at 102, 104-05.

186

See Hardiman, supra note 181, at 216-18, 227.

187

See Charles C. Dunham IV, Comment, “Body Property:” Challenging the Ethical
Barriers in Organ Transplantation to Protect Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L.
39, 50 (2008) (citing Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also
Hardiman, supra note 181, at 225 (“In England, the common law held that there was no
‘property’ right in a dead body and, therefore, it could not be disposed of by will.”) (citing B.
Katz, Increasing the Supply of Human Organs for Transplantation: A Proposal for a System
of Mandated Choice, 18 BEV. HILLS B.A. J. 152, 155 (1984)).
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markers, and monuments.188 The United States, no longer under the influence of
ecclesiastical courts, “devised a way around the rule” and assumed jurisdiction over
dead bodies by declaring that a decedent's relatives had an interest in the body but
only for burial and interment purposes.189
Later, a Rhode Island court described this interest as “quasi-property.”190 State
courts gradually expanded these rights, adding the right to prevent the removal of
body parts, the right to have the corpse remain in its final resting place, the right to
have it buried where the closest relative wants, the right to refuse an autopsy, and the
right to recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the
deceased.191 Recently, courts across the country have held that heirs have
“constitutionally protected property rights” in the corpse of the deceased.192 The
extent of those rights is inconsistent from state to state but generally, they extend to
the prevention of removal of body parts unless the state can assert a countervailing
compelling state interest.193 The Utah Supreme Court even stated that property rights
in cadavers arise directly under the provisions of the UAGA.194 Though no court has
decided a case based on the takings clause, if heirs possess a constitutionally
protected right over the decedent’s body, that property right should be protected
from government takings as well.
The extent of property interest in living persons’ tissues and organs is seemingly
more apparent. The California Supreme Court held in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California that an individual’s cells, used to derive a commercial line,
were not the person’s property and he, therefore, did not have a cause of action for
conversion.195 One could argue that if a living person’s tissues are not his or her own
property, a deceased person’s tissue certainly could not pass to their heirs. However,
at least one commentator has noted that “it is possible that the court's refusal to
188

See Hardiman, supra note 181, at 226.

189

Peterson, supra note 54, at 185.

190

Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237-238 (1872). “That there
is no right of property in a dead body, using the word in its ordinary sense, may well be
admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a
much greater degree than many matters of actual property.” Id. at 238.
191
Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 229
(1996); see also Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (P.A. 1903) ([I]t would be more
accurate to say that the law recognizes property in a corpse, but property subject to a trust, and
limited in its rights to such exercise as shall be in conformity with the duty out of which the
rights arise.”).
192

Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (limited rights form the basis
of constitutionally protected property rights); see Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d
963, 968 (Conn. Super Ct. 1999); see Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W6, 1998 WL 386327, at *3 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998). But see Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant,
335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (emphasis omitted) (holding that there was no
“constitutionally protected right in a decedent’s body”); Albrecht v. Treon, 889 N.E.2d 120,
129 (Ohio 2008) (holding that there was no property right in the decedent’s body).
193
194
195

See generally Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995).
In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n. 4 (Utah 1978).
See Moore v. Regents, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 137 (1990).
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recognize Moore's conversion claim stems from the intuition that body parts cannot
be property so long as they are contained within a living human being.”196 Since
much of the opinion rests on public policy and the lack of judicial decisions or
legislative actions granting a cause of action, this interpretation is persuasive.197
Furthermore, the court only attempted to distinguish Venner v. State, which noted
personal property rights in organs and tissue, instead of refusing to follow it.198 Thus,
it can be distinguished as not relevant to whether organs of the deceased are
property.
b.

Just Compensation

If a protectable quasi-property right exists which courts will protect, then any
taking must be compensated to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment. Another
commentator has argued that even if one’s organs are one’s own during life, no one
obtains constitutional rights to them after death and even if they did, because there
can be no sale, organs have no value to be compensated.199 This assertion flies in the
face of both case law and logic. Courts have determined that next of kin inherit
“constitutionally protected property rights” in the deceased’s organs.200 Furthermore,
just because Congress has banned the sale of organs does not mean that they have no
value. In fact, a kidney recently sold in America for $20,000.201 Typically, just
compensation “is the property's fair market value, so that the owner is theoretically
no worse off after the taking.”202 Fair market value is difficult to determine in the
case of organs because their sale is banned by NOTA.203
It is not fair to say that the fair market value is zero dollars merely because that is
the government’s price ceiling. Determining fair value based on underground
markets would also not be just compensation because underground market prices are
higher because of the risk of being caught and the difficulty in obtaining organs.204
196

Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 374
(2000).
197

See generally Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 120-85. The dissent stated “there [is not] any
reported decision rejecting such a claim [that Moore had retained an ownership interest in his
cells”]. Id. at 161 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
198

See Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (finding that “it is
not unknown for a person to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or control, for
good reason or for no good reason, over such things such as excrement, fluid, waste,
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, blood and organs or other [separated] parts of the body”)
aff’d, 367 A.2d 949 (1977); see also Moore, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 138.
199

See Silver, supra note 124, at 714-15.

200

See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 479-82 (6th Cir. 1991).

201

Drew Griffin & David Fitzpatrick, Donor Says He Got Thousands for His Kidney,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/01/blackmarket.organs/index
.html?iref=allsearch (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
202

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (3d Pocket ed. 2004).

203

See 42 U.S.C.S. § 274e (2011).

204

David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 567, 573 (2002).
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Two possible alternatives are to allow the government to determine the intrinsic
value through statute or to value just compensation as the recovery of the next of kin
in a suit for wrongful interference with a corpse. The former solution, though more
definite, is highly subjective. Since there is no true measure of intrinsic value for
organs, legislatures would eventually need to base their determination on a market
value or some other test with more transparency. The latter solution, as noted by one
commentator, would reflect the emotional distress suffered by the next of kin, rather
than the value of the cadaver itself. Though the value of recoveries in such cases
“would be difficult to ascertain,” it would provide a legitimate starting point.205
Furthermore, it could combine the certainty of the first solution by allowing the
statute to provide the guidelines, varying in amount depending upon the organs taken
and “the nearness of the relationship between the survivor and the deceased.”206 This
plan would incorporate the best of both solutions and provide just compensation for
conscripted organs. Therefore, in order to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment by
conscripting organs, the states should provide just compensation in the form of a
statutorily determined amount derived from wrongful interference with a corpse
recoveries.
2.

Religion

Another objection to organ conscription is that it would violate individuals’ First
Amendment right to freely exercise their religion.207 Based on a letter written by
Thomas Jefferson,208 the Supreme Court held that “Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”209 Therefore, courts have held
that that the free exercise of religion does not permit individuals to "hurt or harm the
overwhelming majority of the community."210 Though the lack of organs is harmful
to people in need of organs, they certainly are not a majority, let alone an

205

Note, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 700 (1969).

206

See id.

207

Abena Richards, Comment, Don't Take Your Organs to Heaven...Heaven Knows We
Need Them Here: Another Look at the Required Response System, 26 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 365,
393 (2006). See CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
208

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messr. Nehemiah Dodge et al. (Jan. 1, 1802), in
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743-1826, at 295 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
“Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that
he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building
a wall of separation between church and State.” Id.
209

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1898) (holding that a law against
polygamy did not violate the free exercise clause).
210

In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944).
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overwhelming majority. Thus, it is doubtful that conscription would not violate the
free exercise clause.211
To ensure that it does not violate the clause, a two-tiered exception to
conscription would be allowed for all persons who believe that donation conflicts
with the practice of their religion or their child’s religion. The first tier would be an
automatic exemption for anyone whose religion does not allow organ donation.212
The second exception would be an opportunity for anyone who feels that their
personal religious beliefs prohibit themselves or their children from donating to
submit a claim to the state board to review and grant an exception. They would be
entitled to this exception even though almost all major western and eastern religions
do not oppose donation.213
Most Christian religions currently take the stance that donation is a great act of
love and support organ donation.214 Catholicism especially supports donation and
Pope John Paul II has stated, “[t]he Catholic Church would promote the fact that
there is a need for organ donors and that Christians should accept this as a 'challenge
to their generosity and fraternal love' so long as ethical principles are followed."215
However, Pope Benedict XVI made clear that organ donation “is morally licit” when
“spontaneous and free.”216 Since mandatory donation is neither spontaneous nor free,
Catholics may express some reservations. Similarly, most other Christian groups
make clear that it is important to leave the choice to the individual.217 Several
Christian groups are less enthusiastic about donation. In particular, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, though not against donation, require all the blood to be drained from the
organ before allowing transplantation.218 Greek Orthodox Christians believe that
211

Another commentator argued that “[i]t is not clear that an organ draft act would violate
the first amendment without such an exemption.” Silver, supra note 124 at 709. He claims
that “[i]t would be ‘plainly incumbent’ upon the state to ‘demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation’ would serve its purpose ‘without infringing on First Amendment rights.’ Id. at
711 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1964)). However, in his final analysis he
decides that an exception for religion is warranted. Id. at 713.
212

See DonateLife, Organ Donation and Your Religion (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.donate
life.gov.au/Discover/Religion--donation.html. Individuals practicing Gypsy or Shinto beliefs
do not allow donation. The former because they believe the soul retains the shape of the body
and the body should not be harmed. The latter group believes that organ donation injures the
dead body, and is a severe crime. Id
213
See id. Though most do not oppose donation, they mainly leave the decision up to the
individual. Mandatory donation may come into conflict with this belief. Furthermore, many
religions believe that donation should be an altruistic gift and may oppose compensation. See
id.
214

Id.

215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Id.

218

Id. Further, Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that blood must not be eaten or transfused.
Godly Respect for Life and Blood, THE WATCHTOWER, June 1, 1969, at 326. Therefore, not
only must the blood be drained from the organ, but also neither the donee nor donor can
receive any blood after the transplantation, which can make the surgery more dangerous. Id.
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donations used to better human life, including transplantation and research, are
acceptable.219
All four major branches of Judaism believe that organ donation is not in conflict
with their religious beliefs.220 Rabbi Dr. Moshe D. Tendler has stated, “[n]o ritual
obligation impedes the effort to save a life unless it would require one to commit the
sin of idolatry, adultery, or murder.”221 He even has gone further stating that
considering the vast deficit of available organs, remuneration to family members is
acceptable considering the great value of saving lives.222 On the other hand, as
evidenced by the extreme organ shortage in Israel, many Jewish people believe that
their religion forbids organ donation.223 In this instance, a mandatory draft would
enable Jewish people to better exercise their religious beliefs.
Muslims are deeply devoted to the concept of saving life.224 Sheikh Omar S.
Abu-Namous, Imam of the Islamic Cultural Center of New York in Manhattan made
clear that it is lawful to donate organs to those whose life or cure is dependant upon
receiving them.225 Islamic law would even allow the taking of organs from the
recently deceased with the permission of the attorney general.226 Similar to the
Jewish opinion on remuneration, a minority of Islamic law jurists are inclined to
allow some compensation to families of donors in light of the organ shortages.227
Islam is as supportive, if not more so, as the other two major western religions when
it comes to organ donation.
In a recent survey of the country, seventy-six percent of Americans identified
themselves as Christians and 2% more identified themselves as Jewish or Muslim.228
219
New Mexico Donor Services, Religious Views on Organ, Tissue, and Blood Donation
available at http://www.donatelifenm.org/religiousviews.htm#greekorth (last visited Mar. 5,
2011).
220

Id.

221

Rabbi Dr. Moshe D. Tendler, The Judeo-Biblical Perspective on Organ Donation: You
Shall Choose Life, www.donatelifeny.org/uploaded_files/tinymce/files/rabbi_tendler.pdf (last
visited Feb. 8, 2011).
222

See id.

223
See Rabbi Lisa Grushcow, A Sermon (2006), http://www.donatelifeny.org/uploaded_
files/tinymce/files/lisa_grushcow.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). In her sermon, she shares a
story of a young Israeli girl flying to America for a liver transplant who passes away on the
flight. Though her parents wanted to donate her organs, they didn’t because their rabbi had
told them it was against Jewish law. Id.
224

DonateLife, supra note 212.

225

See Sheikh Omar S. Abu-Namous, A Organ Donated Is Ongoing Charity (2003),
www.donatelifeny.org/uploaded_files/tinymce/files/abu_namous.pdf (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
226

See id.

227

See id.

228
Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey:
Summary Report (2009), http://www.americanreligionsurveyaris.org/reports/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). Only 2.1% of individuals
identified with Eastern Religions or Other, which are the groups that Shinto and Gypsy would
be only a small part. Id.
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Therefore, because almost all Christian, Jewish, and Muslim sects support donation,
it is likely that even with a religious exception, conscription would increase the
organ supply because many members of religious faiths would not have religious
reasons to opt out.
3.

Commodification

One of the ethical and moral reasons for the ban on receiving valuable
consideration for organs is the fear that human dignity and value would be debased if
body parts could be sold.229 However, recently, at least one state attempted to
provide some sort of funeral payment to organ donors.230 Even though this attempt
failed because of the ban on receiving valuable consideration, it indicates the
understanding that organ shortage is a serious problem and that, in order to solve it,
creative strategies are necessary.231 More importantly, it shows that a funeral benefit
for organ donors is not considered to be as debasing to human dignity. Furthermore,
society may be moving away from the idea that commodifying the dead body is
bad.232
The concept of commodification comes from the fact that a dead body is no
longer a valueless object in the law and should be entitled to property interests and
rights.233 This movement towards commodification is obvious in every lawsuit where
a relative claims ownership over a deceased body.234 By characterizing organs from
the deceased as property, it allows for a person’s heirs to obtain the Constitutional
protection from unlawful takings they deserve, without having to rely upon “quasiproperty” rights.235
Further, the notion that it is immoral to pay money to preserve one's health
conflicts with the reality of medicine in our country. If we believed as a moral
matter that money should never be exchanged for the preservation of life, why is it
acceptable to charge fees for the provision of medical services at all? Politicians
often speak of health care as a “fundamental right” to be provided to all, regardless
229
See Erica D. Roberts, Note, When the Storehouse is Empty: Why Transplant Tourism
Should Not Be Ignored, 52 HOW. L. J. 747, 763 (2009).
230
See Jeffrey P. Kahn, Organ Donation-We’ll Make It Worth Your While, CNN.com,
(May 3, 1999), www.cnn.com/HEALTH/bioethics/archive.index.html.
231

Tendler, supra note 221. It is especially telling that religious leaders have recognized
that some remuneration may be necessary since they are the staunchest opponents of
commodifying the human body. See John Habgood, The Church of England, in Organ and
Tissue Donation for Transplantation 29, 25 (Jeremy R. Chapman et al. eds., 1997); Richard V.
Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Nonaltruistic Kidney Donations in Contemporary Jewish Law
and Ethics, 75 Transplantation 250, 250 (2003).
232

See REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PROPERTY:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION 35-38 (2007).
233

See Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for
Research After Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261, 262 (1998); Erik S. Jaffe, Note, “She's Got
Bette Davis['s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 529-30 (1990).
234

See, e.g., Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 477.

235

See supra Part IV.B.1.a.
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of their means,236 but the reality indicates otherwise. When a patient visits her
physician in need of an antibiotic to cure her life-threatening pneumonia, she is no
less relieved of her obligation to pay than if she were visiting a grocery store and
trying to purchase milk.237 The truth is that individuals are forced to pay for health
care if they want to receive it, and access to the system is far from guaranteed.
Accordingly, either commodifying the human body is morally inappropriate, in
which case the natural extension is that we have a social obligation to provide health
care for all Americans regardless of their ability to pay, or we should consider
various forms of compensation for human organs much like we do for any other
health care treatment. Even if the first option is more appealing, there is no reason
why the provision of life-saving organs should not be funded by a universal state
health care system to ensure access for all. If health care is indeed a fundamental
right, requiring that people pay for life-saving medicines or operations is not morally
any different than making them pay for life-saving human organs.238
Thus, the concept of remuneration for health care services and products is
accepted practice in the United States, as Americans believe in exchange systems to
varying degrees in all aspects of life. With respect to compensating for organs, an
argument can be made that government regulation is necessary to prevent abuse and
exploitation, but it is much more difficult to make the case that a compensation
involving the human body is altogether immoral. Since this Note does not advocate
the sale of organs by the living, many other commodification arguments are
irrelevant.239
4.

Loss of Autonomy

Americans have a strong belief in individual freedom and autonomy, to which
conscription may run counter.240 Many people believe that they should be free from
government interference with their bodies. Commentators have argued that
conscription eliminates an individual’s autonomous decision to leave his corpse
untouched. However, the real impact of conscription is upon the corpse itself. The
question becomes whether the corpse has some fuzzy right of autonomy. And even
if it does, is it so important that it surpasses the importance of saving the life of a
living American? It seems clear that since the government already has significant

236

Even the President has deemed health care one of his most important issues. Organizing
for America, Issues, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
237
It is important to note that emergency health care is the exception to this general reality,
as The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) guarantees access to
all Americans regardless of their ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
238

See Susan Hankin Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 Va. L. Rev.
1015, 1033 (1985) (stating that “the wealth discrimination argument logically applies to all
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control over how we dispose our deceased bodies,241 it is unrealistic to argue that the
deceased have a right of autonomy superseding the value of the lives their organs
could save. One commentator has argued that conscription would be politically
impossible to implement, but provides no evidence that it would be.242 Even if it may
be politically difficult to gain support, in light of the lives that would be saved, it
would be foolish to eliminate conscription as an option. Important legislation should
not be ignored because it lacks political expediency, especially when American lives
are at stake.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current system of organ donation is simply not working. The demand for
organs far exceeds the supply, and the gap is only growing. Though the intentions of
the drafters of the NOTA and the UAGA were noble, the combination of altruism
and voluntary donation embedded in those Acts are not workable solutions to this
crisis.
Realizing this pressing need, several proposed solutions have come forward. The
least controversial, routine request, has also proven to be ineffective. Presumed
consent, though better at obtaining organs, is really conscription in disguise and
would amount to a taking without just compensation. Finally, an organ market of
any kind would marginalize the poor and create a society where only the rich could
afford organs, and the poor would be forced to sell their organs out of desperation.
Organ conscription, with just compensation, is the best way to increase the organ
supply and save the lives of those who desperately need an organ. By forcing
donation, something that the vast majority of Americans agree upon, it would
eliminate the need for transplant tourism and the black market. Since the taking
would be compensated, it would fall in line with the Fifth Amendment. With a
simple exception for religious beliefs, it would not violate the free exercise clause.
Furthermore, it would not exploit the poor or underprivileged and would enable
them to obtain life-saving organs as well. No other solution could likely provide as
many organs. Organ conscription is therefore the best solution to the current organ
shortage. Without this overhaul of our current organ donation system, many
Americans will continue to lose their lives needlessly.
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